Abstract
Introduction.
Digital systems are increasingly used in applications that require extremely high reliability. Some such applications include aerospace, transportation, control in harsh environments, etc.. .
Over the years, several techniques have been developed for improving the reliability of digital systems at all levels. An excellent survey of the subject is [l].
System-level techniques (such as N-tuple Modular
Redundancy [2]) are essentially based on the addition of spare duplicate units. These units may contribute to the system's functioning at all times (static redundancy), or be used as replacements in case a failure is detected (dynamic redundancy). In particular, with static redundancy techniques, each functional part (module) of a given digital circuit is replicated N times so as to obtain N independent copies of each output signal. Each vector of N equivalent signals is then connected to a restoring organ (i.e., a majority voting element). Failure of a single component is thus overrun by the other components, and the voter's output is thus a more reliable primary output. These techniques can be employed at gate level as well. At this level, however, it is possible to take advantage of the intrinsic error masking capabilities of logic gates in order to avoid the explicit introduction of voting elements. With typical gate-level approaches to fault-tolerance (such as quadded-logic [3] and interwoven-redundancy [4] ) logic gates (or subcircuits) are replicated and interconnected in a way that prevents the propagation of logic errors caused by internal faults [3, 4, 5, 6 , 71. System-and gate-level techniques preserve the topology of the original system. So they do not take into account the degrees of freedom avalaible to further optimize the fault-tolerant network. Instead, if fault-tolerance requirements are considered during logic synthesis, all the degrees of freedom available for logic optimization could ideally be used to reduce the amount of fault-masking redundancy. An alogrithm for the two-level synthesis of fault-tolerant digital circuits was proposed by Pradhan and Reddy [8] , but no methods have been developed so far for the synthesis of multilevel fault-tolerant networks.
In this paper we take a step in this direction, and present a new approach to the design of faulttolerant circuits, based on a multilevel logic synthesis paradigm. Each gate of an original arbitrary combinational network is re-synthesized so as to achieve fault tolerance with a minimum addition of hardware. This is accomplished by taking advantage of the errormasking properties of individual gates and of the functional redundancies already present in the network. In particular, in this paper we target networks that are multilevel fault-tolerant, i.e. that can confine the errors introduced by a fault in a small region. Quadded networks are an example of such networks.
We tested our algorithms against several benchmark combinational circuits. Substantial hardware savings (sometimes in excess of 40 %) have been obtained with respect to quadding. In principle, the Boolean operation realized at each vertex is arbitrary. For the sake of simplicity, however, hereafter we assume that each vertex represents a NOR gate. Hence, for a gate 9 , the output function can be expressed as
Multilevel Optimization.
Multilevel logic optimization of a given Boolean network consists on the application of a suitable set of network tranformations that improve a target parameter (area, delay, power consumption) while preserving the network functionality [ll, 121. In this paper we consider an approach based on a sequence of local optimizations of internal gates. The optimization of a gate is carried out based on the following observations. Eq. (1) indicates that the function g(x) realized by a gate is the NOR of functions gi(x), each of which
In general, a function g can be realized not only as the NOR of given functions g i , but also as the NOR of other functions, maybe already available in the network. Local resynthesis attempts the optimization of each gate precisely by trying to re-express each gate function as a NOR of fewer and / or simpler functions.
Faults and Fault-Tolerance.
As mentioned, we refer in this paper to NOR-only networks, for the sake of convenience. The results of the paper, however, can be extended to networks of arbitrary elementary gates.
We consider in this paper single stuck-at type faults, occurring either at a gate input or at a gate output. The following terminology will be used extensively afterwards to classify the impact of a fault in a network : Fault-tolerance targets the design of networks that preserve correct behavior even in presence of a fault. Some faults, however, such as stuck-at's on primary inputs or outputs, are clearly inherently intolerable and cannot be targeted by any approach to fault-tolerance.
Definition 3.3 We call internal faults the faults that can affect gate inputs and outputs, except those on primary inputs, those on interconnections from primary inputs, those on the primary outputs and critical faults at the inputs of the output-driving gates. For our purposes, a network if termed fault-tolerant if its functionality is not affected b y any single internal fault.
Hereafter, we refer implicitly only to internal faults.
Multilevel Fault-Tolerant Networks.
All gate-level techniques for constructing faulttolerant logic networks take advantage of the masking properties of logic gates to compensate, as soon as possible, the errors produced by internal faults. Standard techniques, such as quadding, actually grant that the effects of a single fault never propagate through more than one logic level. This Fig. (2) Rule 3. Two gates g l , g 2 with no common fanin are termed independent. Equivalent gates feeding a common gate must be independent. Otherwise a fault on a common input could produce multiple sub-critical errors at the inputs of another gate, which may go uncompensated.
It is worth noting that, in order to satisfy the above rules, quadding must actually quadruple all internal gates. Rules (1-3) do not take into account the functionality realized at the various gates. For instance, Rule (2) is too resctrictive: A sub-critical error affecting a gate input may also be masked by another, non-equivalent input. in Fig. (lb) , we achieve the same degree of faulttolerance without doubling any gate. 0
In the next paragraph we replace Rules (1-3) with rules of functional nature, and we show that these rules are necessary and sufficient for a network to be multilevel fault-tolerant.
Functional Rules for Multilevel Fault-
Tolerance.
As we consider NOR-only networks, Rule (1) needs not be modified. The following Theorem provides a functional criterion replacing Rule (2). In this section we illustrate the basic algorithms involved in the construction of a minimal multilevel fault-tolerant network. This construction entails twolevel re-synthesis of portions of the network. The next paragraph describes how the classical two-level synthesis paradigm must be modified to account for Rules (2') and (3').
Theorem 3.1 A NOR-gate g tolerates all single subcritical errors affecting its inputs if and only if each minterm x of g'(x) is covered at least twice, (i.e.there are at least two input gates g l , g 2 E F I ( g ) such that g1(x> = gz(x) = 1 ).

Proof 3.1 (If part): Consider a subcritical error affecting an input signal g1 of g . This error turns a logic 1 on the input into a logic 0. Since each minterm x of g'(x) covered b y g 1 is also covered by an error-free input signal g Z I the sub-critical error is masked for each relevant input configuration. (Only i f part): Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a minterm x of g'(x) covered only b y 91. If a s-a-0 fault occurs on
Two-Level Synthesis
The two-level synthesis engine takes as input a single-output, two-level NOR-NOR network, realizing a function f. The flow of two-level synthesis follows the two-step paradigm of implicant extraction and minimum-cost covering [13] . Since we are working in a multiple-level synthesis environment, implicants of f are selected among other, already existing internal functions and their logic NORs [ll] .
The output is a two-level, NOR-NOR network that satisfies Rules (2') and (3'). In particular, it finds a cover of a function f'(x) such that: 1) each minterm x is covered at least twice; 2) for each minterm x , at least two of the implicants covering x must be generated by independent gates. Requirements (1) and (2) do not add to the complexity of implicant extraction. Instead, they make the construction of a minimum-cost cover more complex. The classical covering step is thus modified as follows:
1) Whenever an implicant is included in a partial cover, it is not removed from the list of candidate implicants. This means that it is still available for inclusion a second time.
2) Whenever an implicant is included in a partial cover, its cost is dynamically evaluated as: i) the cost of its implementation, plus ii) the cost possibly induced by the necessity of duplicating portions of hardware in order to achieve independence. There are three cases that require duplication. They are reported in Fig. (3) .
Case 1. This case is illustrated in Fig. (3a) . Gate f, under optimization, must be independent from another gate (in this case, gate e ) . Hence, any implicants of f' that are also inputs to e must be duplicated if they are to be included in a cover off'. Case 2. To grant satisfaction of Rule (37, implicants covering a common minterm of a function f' must be made independent by duplicating common fanin, as shown in Fig. (3b) .
Case 3. If an implicant g1 is essential to f' (i. e., it is the unique implicant that can cover some minterm of f'), then it must necessarily be selected twice. Hence, gate g1 has to be duplicated as well as its fanin, as shown in Fig. (3c) .
It is worth noting that quadding can be regarded as a systematic use of the duplications of Case (3), while Cases (1) and (2) are not acknowledged. Hence, quadding represents a worst-case bound to our method.
Multiple-Level Synthesis.
The input of the synthesis algorithm is an arbitrary NOR-only network. The network may or may not have redundancies or fault-tolerance properties. Gates are topologically sorted and then visited in order, starting from primary outputs. Each gate is regarded as the output of a two-level network, which is re-synthesized using the algorithms of Section (4.1). In this way, we are sure that at every time the alreadysynthesized portion of the network is multilevel faulttolerant. The program terminates when all gates have been visited.
Observability don't cares.
The notion of observability don't cares has been proficuos in the development of accurate multiple-level logic optimization algorithms [ll, 121.
It is possible to port this notion also in the synthesis of fault-tolerant networks. Consider, to this regard, the situation of Fig. (4b) . Function f ' (~) is double-covered by functions gl(x), jl(x), g2(x), g3(x).
Inspection of the covering shows that some minterms of f' are actually covered three times. Corresponding to these minterms, the value of an implicant function (say, gl) can be changed without affecting the double-covering of f. Hence, the value of 91, is irrelevant (don't care) for these minterms. These don't carescan be spent for the optimization of 91.
It could be shown that these observability don't care conditions can be computed and propagated essentially by the traditional means [14] . The formal proof, however, is out of the scope of this paper.
Implementation and Experimental
Results.
We have implemented in C the algorithms described in this paper. We have used a standard BDD package to implement the basic manipulation routines for Boolean functions. The algorithms were tested against a set of well-known logic synthesis benchmarks [15, 161. The circuits were initially optimized by running the optimization program SIS [17] . Table (1) reports the initial circuit statistics, in terms of input, output, NOR gate and interconnection counts. The data refer to the optimized circuits. The second column refers to the gate and interconnection counts of the quadded versions of the networks. The last column reports the gate and interconnection counts of the circuits obtained by our algorithm (named FT-SYN), as well as the CPU time required. Time was taken on a SUN SPARCstation IPX.
The average improvement with respect to quadding is of 18%. 6 Conclusions and Future Work.
Traditional means of designing fault-tolerant logic networks used topology-based replication techniques, that are inefficient in terms of area and may add excessive redundancies.
In this paper we took a more global synthesis approach. We showed that it is possible to take into account internal don't care conditions and synthesize a fault-tolerant network by locally adding just the minimal amount of extra hardware needed. The experimental results in this sense are extremely encouraging. In this paper, we targeted the synthesis of multilevel fault-tolerant networks, having in addition strong fault-confinement properties. In the future we plan to generalize the ideas and algorithms to tackle more general classes of fault-tolerant networks.
